Competition between Different Ride-pooling Platforms with Differential Pooling Size
With the developments of smartphone application and online payment, different types of demand-responsive mobility service platforms have gained increasing popularity in many cities. Besides private sectors (e.g., Uber, Lyft, and Didi Chuxing), some ride-pooling platforms operated by public sectors (e.g., the transit operator) emerged to provide differential ride-pooling services upon passengers’ requests (e.g., shared-van). On one hand, these alternatives could provide differential services for user and have an influence on the user’s choice; on the other hand, different operators may compete for different objectives and adopt counteractive strategies. This study considers a duopoly market with two types of ride-pooling services, characterized by different pooling sizes and pricing strategies. The competition between ride-pooling platforms are modeled by a game-theoretical approach. We consider two types of market regimes where the operators act either simultaneously in a non-cooperative game or sequentially in a leader-follower fashion. In each market regime, we investigate the optimal strategies (e.g., pricing, fleet size and pooling size) of each operator with different objectives, i.e., profit-maximization or system-cost minimization. The results of this study will enhance our understanding of users’ reaction to the new services and provide important insights on the integration and regulation of the market.
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